



DIGITAL SERVICES TAXES - AND ALTERNATIVES

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Stockholm, February 4, 2020



Why tax profit digital services in location of the user?

- ▀ “This measure is not expected to have any significant macroeconomic impacts”
(UK Treasury)
- ▀ So a pure revenue grab: a “Sutton Tax”

Where do we tax profit now?

Based on 1920s compromise ...

- ▮ Tax *active* income in the location of economic activity – the “*source*” country
- ▮ Tax *passive* income in the place of ownership – the “*residence*” country

Where do we tax profit now?

RESIDENCE OF SHAREHOLDERS

Worldwide

HEADQUARTERS / PARENT COMPANY

One location

US: GILTI

AFFILIATES

Many locations

Mostly tax here

SALES

Worldwide

How well does the existing system shape up?

- Economic efficiency – poor
- Robustness to avoidance – poor
- Ease of administration – very poor
- Incentive compatibility – poor
- *Fairness difficult to call*

UK Treasury position on digital services

“1.1 The international tax framework is underpinned by the principle that the profit of a multinational group should be taxed in the countries in which it creates value ...

1.3 The UK continues to support that position.”

*H.M. Treasury, Digital Services Tax: Consultation
November 2018*


Taxing where “value is created”



- ▮ Is NOT the basis of the current system
- ▮ Difficult or impossible to say where value is created
- ▮ A concept shoehorned into service of revenue collection



Some other issues with the DST

- Based on revenue
 - Arbitrarily ring-fences social media platforms, internet search engines and online marketplaces
 - The UK proposal will raise less than 1% of corporation tax revenue
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A more coherent approach ...



Gains on at least four criteria if tax base is **less mobile**, e.g. where consumers are resident

- *Economic efficiency*
- *Robustness to avoidance*
- *Ease of administration*
- *Incentive compatibility*

Fundamental reform options

RESIDENCE OF SHAREHOLDERS	HEADQUARTERS / PARENT COMPANY	AFFILIATES	SALES
Worldwide	One location	Many locations	Worldwide
		RPAI	DBCFT
			RPAI


A more coherent approach?

- Residual Profit Allocation by Income (RPAI)
- Allocate rights to tax routine profit to where functions and activities take place
- Allocate rights to tax residual profit to where sales are made

Fundamental reform options

RESIDENCE OF SHAREHOLDERS	HEADQUARTERS / PARENT COMPANY	AFFILIATES	SALES
Worldwide	One location	Many locations	Worldwide
			DBCFT
		RPAI	RPAI
	Pillar 2	Pillar 1 & 2	Pillar 1

Pillar 1 – taxing residual profit in the market country

- Moving in direction of principle of immobility
 - Allocates only *part* of residual profit to market country
 - Still not clear where this is taken from
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Pillar 2 – taxing residual profit in the market country

- ▮ Allocates taxing rights to the country of the parent (*income inclusion rule*)
- ▮ And may deny deduction for payments (*tax on base eroding payments*)



Pillar 2 – taxing residual profit in the market country

- Not consistent with principle of immobility
- Aiming to reduce profit shifting or tax competition?
 - OECD BEPS approach is: “no or low taxation is not *per se* a cause of concern, but it becomes so when it is associated with practices that *artificially segregate taxable income from the activities that generate it.*”

Concluding thoughts



- Moving towards taxing profit in the market country (or country of user) makes sense
 - And is arguably inevitable
 - DST is not the way to do it
 - Pillar 1 is a modest step in the right direction

